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Abstract 
In order to conduct a quality financial audit both information about financial indicators and about the corporate governance 
that a company has are mandatory. This study presents the correlation between financial audit and corporate governance of 
the entities that are listed on the Bucharest Stock of Exchange that had to comply with IFRS approach. Using a 
simultaneous equation model, positive influence is detected between financial audit, proxy by audit fees, and the type of 
auditor and negative effect is found between the existence of audit committee, the non- existence of CEO/chair duality and 
the one tier management system. 
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1. Introduction 
Prior research in the fields of accounting and finance has provided little evidence about the corporate 
governance elements. In fact, the corporate governance policies have been differently tackled on research paper. 
The most common approach of corporate governance is based on the agency theory. The agent theory was 
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firstly introduced by Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and it considers that the manager act according to their self-
interest, even though this behaviour can create losses to shareholders. As a fact, the purpose of corporate 
governance is to design contractual mechanisms for controlling for this type of behaviour.  The idea behind it is 
that the members from the board should be independent from management team in order to ensure the control 
and the supervision of the activities the managers do (Cohen et al, 2000). 
The second approach upon which the corporate governance relies on comes from management and it 
encounters a resource dependence perspective (Boyd, 1990). According to this theory, managers and the board 
of directors help each other in developing strategies and policies. The members from the board have the ability 
and the knowledge to provide access or to attract external financing resources. 
The last approach of corporate governance denies its fundamental role. The perspective is based on 
managerial hegemony and thus, the role of corporate governance is only symbolic as it cannot be used for 
controlling and monitoring activities (Kosnick, 1987). According to this perspective, the board’s functions are 
limited to regulatory requirements and to increase management’s compensation (Core et al, 1999). 
One main problem of these views is related with the fact that there is no reference at financial auditor as 
being important in corporate governance. Thus, the present research tries to detect the correlation between 
financial auditor characteristics and the corporate governance elements considering the Romanian market. 
The remain of the paper is structured as follows: firstly, a short literature review is presented considering the 
correlation between financial audit and corporate governance variables, after that the section corresponding to 
methodology of research is revealed, being followed by a section where the results are discussed. The paper 
ends with conclusions and recommendations and with presenting future perspectives of research. 
2. Literature review 
In general, when the correlation between financial audit and corporate governance is encountered, the 
relation that is frequently researched is how the corporate governance variables affect financial audit. In several 
studies, a proxy for financial audit is audit fees. The relationship between auditor’s remuneration and other 
corporate governance variables significantly depend on board characteristics (the type of control that the board 
of directors exert considering the controlling and the monitoring activities). For example, O’Sullivan, 2000 
found that larger the proportion of non-executive directors is, higher the audit fees are, while Gul and Tsui, 
2001 report positive correlation between audit fees and high cash flow. Carcello et al., 2002 proved that the 
audit remuneration depend on the board independence. It seems that as the board is more independent, it is 
more inclined to pay higher fees to external auditor.  Opposite to them, Maug and Schneider, 2008 find no 
evidence to support the correlation between audit fees and the independence of the board of directors. In 
another research conducted by Mitra et al, 2007 the results emphasize that a company is more inclined to pay 
higher audit fees if it has a diffused institutional ownership. 
Negative results were found by Frankel et al, 2002 who point out that the existence of non-audit services can 
affect auditor independence and can encourage the appearance of discretionary accruals. On the other hand, 
Larcker and Richardson, 2004 consider that these particular elements can appear if the company has a weak 
governance system. Moreover, it seems that auditor’s reputation mitigates this kind of practices. 
Regarding other elements of corporate governance and their correlation with the auditor’s fees, an important 
role is given to the audit committee.  Researches such as those conducted by Abbott et al., 2003 or by Gaynor et 
al, 2006 report a positive relationship between the existence of the audit committee and the amount the auditors 
receive for their auditing activity. Similar results were detected by Voller et al, 2013, Steward, 2006,  while 
other researches such as the one conducted by Cohen and Hanno, 2000 consider that the risk associated with the 
auditor’s activity should be mitigated once the existence of audit committee is  revealed.  
Another corporate governance variable is the one that encounters the duality between the CEO and the 
chairman of the company. The literature reports that firms with independent corporate boards pay lower audit 
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fees (Tsui et al, 2001). The explanation is due to the fact that the company is associated as having a lower 
corporate risk.  On another research conducted by Desender et al, 2009 the results prove that  the CEO/chair 
duality influences in a negative way the auditor’s remuneration. 
Regarding the Romanian market, only few studies looked at the corporate governance elements. One of them 
is the study conducted by Dobre et al, 2012a who proved that the existence of audit committee and the 
existence of information related with corporate governance mechanism influence the type of auditor, which is 
another measure to provide evidence about the auditor’s activity. Another research is conducted by Dobre et al, 
2012b where they found positive correlation between audit fees and managers’ remuneration. 
3. Methodology of research 
The idea of research is to provide evidence about the relationship between financial audit and corporate 
governance elements. The existing literature is focusing either on multiple regression models, either on binary 
models (where the dependent variable is represented by the type of auditor) or either on simultaneous equations 
models. Our research is conducted using a simultaneous equation model, as we consider that interdependencies 
between financial audit and corporate governance variables exist. The research is conducted upon the 
companies that are listed on the Bucharest Stock of Exchange. 
In order to select the companies that we included into our database, we picked all entities that have to report 
their individual financial statements using IFRS approach from 2012. According to Romanian Financial 
Supervision Authority, 71 companies have to report their individual financial statements using the new 
accounting regime. From the initial sample, we excluded the companies that had a negative value of their own 
shareholder capital between 2010 and 2012 (which included both the transition period to the IFRS measures 
and the year of adoption). We also excluded the companies that were in insolvency between 2010 and 2012 and 
the companies that did not present information related to auditor’s remuneration. In the end, our sample 
encounters 41 companies.  
 Our aim was to conduct the analysis on most recent data. Unfortunately, no enough information about 
auditors fees was found for 2012 and 2013, so consequently, the model was implemented using information 
from 2011. The data have been collected from individual company’s site, both from their financial statements 
and from the corporate governance document.  
In our analysis, we include several proxies to measure corporate governance impact upon the financial audit. 
According to some studies (Cheng, 2008, Yermark) , the size that the supervisory board has and the existence 
of audit committee have an impact upon the audit risk and also upon the effort that financial auditors do during 
an auditing process. Considering this, we include in our analysis the existence of the audit committee 
(DCOMT) that takes 1 if the company has an audit committee and 0 otherwise. For the supervisory board, we 
use as proxy the number of executive directors that the company has (NOEXB). By analyzing individual 
financial statements, we observe that some entities do not have exactly a number established for the executive 
members from the board. Thus, in order to obtain a reliable estimation we establish the mean of the number of 
executive members that the company has.  
We also included the type of  management system that the company has as a dummy variable (DSYST). As 
a fact, if an entity has a one tier management system than the value of DSYST is 1, otherwise if the company 
has a two tier management system than the value of the dummy variable is 0. Another variable that is also 
correlated with the corporate governance principle is the difference among CEO and chairman or the CEO/chair 
duality. We consider that its influence can be measured using a dummy variable that we coded DCEO. We 
conferred 1 if the person that is CEO is different from the person which is the chairman of the company. 
Considering the auditor characteristics two variables have been used such as the value of audit fees 
(measured though the logarithmic value and coded LOGAF and the type of auditor that the company has, 
measured by using a dummy variable (the variable was coded as DAUD). The variable took 1 if the auditor was 
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a company from BIG4: PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Ernst & Youngand Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 
otherwise the variable took 0. 
We also considered some individual variables such as the percent of shares that the major shareholder has 
(PCT ) the return on assets (which serves as proxy for profitability and which is coded ROA), the size of the 
company (measured though the logarithmic value of total assets- coded LOGTA) and the indebtedness ratio 
(measured as the ratio between total debts that the entity has and the value of shareholders’ own capital-which 
is coded as LEV). All variables were calculated using financial data a year before our analysis is conducted. 
As we have mention before, the model upon which we conduct the research is a simultaneous equation 
model, which has two equations. Its structural form is presented in equation (1) and equation (2)  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
 
 
Where iε  and iμ  are the error terms of the system and i is from 1 to 41 
Each equation of the system is over-identified due to the fact that the number of endogenous variables 
(which are LOGAF and NOBEX) minus one is less than the number of variables that are missing from each 
equation. 
In order to determine the un-bias value of the coefficients, the model is estimated in two stages: firstly, the 
reduced form of the equation was estimated and secondly, the fitted values are used as proxy for the 
endogenous variables in the structural form. 
The hypotheses upon which the research is conducted are: 
 
H1: There should be a negative correlation between the type of system and the auditor’s fees, but this 
correlation depends on the size of the company. 
H2. There is a negative relationship between the CEO/chair duality and the auditor’s fees. 
H3. There is a negative relationship between the existence of the audit committee and the auditor’s fees. 
H4. : There is a positive relationship between the type of auditor  and the auditor’s fees. 
H5: There is a negative correlation between the number of executive directors and the auditors’ fees. 
4. Results and discussions 
As it was mentioned, the purpose of this analysis is to provide evidence about the correlation between the 
financial auditor’s characteristic and the corporate governance variables. For revealing this aspect, firstly the 
correlation matrix has been pointed out. The correlation matrix is presented in table 1. 
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Table 1. The correlation matrix 
Element LOGAF DSYST DCEO DCOMT DAUD NOEXB PCT ROA LEV LOGTA 
LOGAF 1          
DSYST -0.343** 1         
DCEO -0.097 -0.245 1        
DCOMT -0.026 -0.350** 0.173 1       
DAUD 0.147 -0.192 0.061 0.029 1      
NOEXB 0.062 -0.125 0.186 0.201 0.4219* 1     
PCT 0.149 0.212 0.063 -0.325** 0.147 0.086 1    
ROA -0.069 0.032 0.049 0.165 -0.171 -0.051 -0.136 1   
LEV 0.132 0.131 -0.241 -0.099 0.037 -0.263 0.094 -0.090 1  
LOGTA 0.481* -0.355** 0.160 0.254 0.133 0.415* 0.207 0.019 -0.053 1 
 
As it can be seen in table 1, the size of the company has more than one correlation above 0.4. It seems that 
larger the company is, higher the auditor’s fees are. Another correlation is found between the size of the 
company and the number of executive directors. In order to provide evidence if this is a good estimator, both 
the model where it (LOGTA) was included and the model were it was excluded is presented in table 2. Another 
important correlation is found between the auditor’s type and the number of executive members from the 
board.  
According to the estimation procedures, we expect to have better results in case the size of the company is 
excluded from the analysis. The results are presented in table 2. 
Table 2. The correlation between audit fees and corporate governance variables 
Element Model where the 
size of the company 
was included 
Model where the 
size of the company 
was not included 
Constant 4.8448*  5.3409* 
DSYST -0.5765* -0.5329* 
DCEO -0.2125* -0.1457* 
DCOMT -0.1952* -0.1135* 
DAUD -0.1536*** 0.0704** 
NOEXB 0.1510* 0.0007 
R squared 65.48% 75.73% 
DW 2.32 2.52 
Heteroscedasticity Yes No 
 
From table 2, it can be seen that the model that better fits the results is the model where the size of the 
company was not included. The explanation is due to the fact that higher values are associated with R-squared 
and moreover, in the second model, there is no evidence of heteroschedasticy . 
From table 2, it can be seen, that all variables have the coefficients statistically significant from zero. The 
results provide evidence that the existence of the one tier unit system negatively affect the amount that the 
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financial auditors receive. Also, when the companies’ size is taken into consideration, the sign of the 
coefficient does not change. Thus, our results rely on H1. 
Considering the CEO/chair duality, significant negative correlation with the auditor’s fees was detected. In 
other words, if the CEO of the company is not the same as its president, than we expect to have higher 
transparency in reporting. Consequently, the risk associated with the auditor’s activity is mitigated, so fewer 
fees are paid to financial auditor as part of remuneration contract. Based on this, hypothesis H2 is true. 
Regarding the existence of the audit committee, the results provide evidence that the hypothesis H3 has to be 
valid. The presence of audit committee and its activity is considered to mitigate the audit risk that financial 
auditor encounters. The results are in accordance with the results found by Cohen and Hanno, 2000. 
As the literature reveals, there is a positive relationship between the type of auditor and the auditor’s fees. 
The justification comes from the fact that BIG4 auditors are more inclined to report fraud due to their 
reputation (Michaely and Shaw, 1995). As a fact, H4 is valid. 
When it comes to the number of executive directors from the board and the auditor’s remuneration, no 
statistically significant assumption could be made for Romanian companies. Even though the sign associated 
with the number of executive directors from the board is positive, it is no statistically significant from zero. 
Due to this, H5 is rejected. 
The results are similar with the results obtained by Voeller et. al, 2013 when the existence of audit 
committee and the type of auditors are encountered. Considering that we have replace the number of 
supervisory members with the number of executive board, same positive relationship was obtained, but no 
statistically relevant 
5. Conclusions 
The purpose of this research was to point out the correlation that exists between the financial audit and 
corporate governance variables for Romanian companies. Initially, information on a sample of 71 companies 
was collected, but due to negative value of their own capital, due to lack of data regarding auditor’s 
remuneration or due to the fact that some of them have opened their insolvency procedure, the research was 
conducted using a sample of only 41 companies. When it comes to data, the analysis was implemented using 
financial information for 2011. The data was modelled using a simultaneous equation model. We consider that 
there is interdependency between financial audit variables and corporate governance indicators.  
The results present some particular features of the Romanian companies. First of all, there is a positive 
correlation between the type of the auditor and the fees they receive for their audit process. That means that 
high quoted auditors ask for higher fees for their audit activities. 
We also found negative influence of corporate governance variables upon the auditor’s remuneration. As a 
fact, if a company has one tier management system then the amount received by auditors is also smaller than 
the fees that they get when the company is having a two tier management system. Negative correlation was also 
detected between the value of auditor’s fees and the existence of the audit committee. The explanation comes 
with the fact that the existence of the audit committee mitigates the risks associated with auditing activities, 
thus the auditor’s remuneration has to be smaller.  
Similar conclusions were obtained considering the CEO/chair duality. As a fact, if there are two persons that 
hold the CEO and the president position, then the amount that the auditors received is smaller than in the case 
where only one person has both position. As there is higher transparency and lower risk when the CEO differs 
from the company chairman, the managers give smaller fees to financial auditors. 
Regarding the number of executive members from the board, no reliable conclusion could be subtracted 
from our analysis, as the coefficient associated with it is not statistically significant from zero. 
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The lacks of the research are related with the lack of transparency for Romanian companies, considering that 
they do not report the auditor’s remuneration, with the fact that the data have been manually collected and with 
the small dimension that our sample has. 
Future research aims to determine the influence of other corporate governance measures such as the impact 
of supervisory board, the way the internal audit process is conducted upon financial audit using both a 
simultaneous equation model and a model that is based on other techniques of estimation : such as binary 
models.   
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